Direct Lending strategies continued to shine
The Private Direct Lending market continued to attract qualified investor attention as yields remain elevated and default activity stayed in check. The market consists of directly originated loans to small and middle-market companies, often defined as those with annual revenues between $5 million and $1 billion. The bespoke loans are often floating rate, senior-secured obligations, meaning these investors will be first in line to recoup losses before any other debt holders in the case of default. Private direct loans have historically experienced lower loss rates to bank loans and high-yield bonds, with similar or better recovery rates in default situations2. Private Direct Loans were once a market dominated by banks. However, private asset managers began to rapidly grow their direct lending business following the 2008 Great Financial Crisis when banks shed illiquid assets amid heightened regulatory oversight. Investor interest in Direct Lending strategies continued its upward trajectory as upper-single-digit to double-digit income has been generated from a combination of higher interest rates and up-front origination fees charged to borrowers, over the 10-calendar year period of 2014 to 20232. The floating-rate nature of direct private loans has also historically insulated investors from the detrimental effects of rising interest rates experienced by many fixed-rate bond investors in recent years. Moreover, many of these small and middle-market borrowers are owned by private equity firms, helping to provide an added layer of protection as the private equity sponsors are generally incentivized to mitigate risk their investment by ensuring the company’s debt is repaid.
While we believe the growth in the industry over the past decade has been positive, the performance of Direct Lending strategies over time has increased category’s appeal. Direct loans have outperformed high-yield bonds, bank loans, and the Bloomberg U.S. Aggregate Bond Index in 6 of the past 10 calendar years (see chart 1). In addition, the private loans are generally valued on a quarterly basis and have exhibited much less volatility than their public high-yield bond and bank loan counterparts, over the 10 year period noted in chart 1.
While Direct Lending strategies were not directly impacted by rise in interest rates in recent years, the borrowers that consist of small to mid-sized businesses were subject to higher interest payments as the loan terms were continually reset higher. Thus far, most businesses have been able to navigate new higher interest rate regime with minimal impact3. Yet, it is our view that many over-leveraged businesses are unable to pass along rising costs to their consumers are hopeful that future interest rate cuts remain in the Fed’s near-term plan. Although traditional default rates imply that business fundamentals may be improving, several underlying trends suggest that cross currents may be hidden just below the surface4. Companies are increasingly attempting to restructure their debt prior to default or convert to payment-in-kind (PIK) loans2, 3. Converting to a PIK loan allows the borrowers to pay interest in the form of non-cash principal, thereby increasing the principal amount of the loan. While cash-saving tools such as PIK loans may buy time in the hope that lower rates lie ahead, we continue to monitor activity that may highlight further deterioration (or improvement) in borrower creditworthiness. Yet, even if defaults (or nonaccruals) increase from the current low levels, we believe the potential for outsized yields generated by Direct Lending can potentially offset any moderate rise in stress that may occur. Identifying direct lenders that have a robust pipeline, as well as the specialized knowledge and skill to properly underwrite, structure, and monitor deals is critical to avoiding any potential uptick in stress that may occur in the private credit markets.
Chart 1. Calendar year performance of private and public credit categories
2014 |
2015 |
2016 |
2017 |
2018 |
2019 |
2020 |
2021 |
2022 |
2023 |
10-Year Annualized Return |
Direct Lending 9.57% |
Direct Lending 5.54% |
High Yield 17.14% |
Direct Lending 8.62% |
Direct Lending 8.07% |
High Yield 14.2% |
U.S. Agg 7.51% |
Direct Lending 12.78% |
Direct Lending 6.29% |
High Yield 13.45% |
Direct Lending 8.84% |
U.S. Agg 5.94% |
U.S. Agg 0.57% |
Direct Lending 11.24% |
High Yield 7.5% |
U.S. Bank Loans 0.46% |
Direct Lending 9% |
High Yield 7.11% |
High Yield 5.28% |
U.S. Bank Loans -0.77% |
U.S. Bank Loans 13.32% |
High Yield 4.59% |
High Yield 2.46% |
U.S. Bank Loans -0.7% |
U.S. Bank Loans 10.11% |
U.S. Bank Loans 4.14% |
U.S. Agg 0.02% |
U.S. Agg 8.73% |
Direct Lending 5.45% |
U.S. Bank Loans 5.2% |
High Yield -11.19% |
Direct Lending 12.13% |
U.S. Bank Loans 4.41% |
U.S. Bank Loans 1.59% |
High Yield -4.46% |
U.S. Agg 2.66% |
U.S. Agg 3.55% |
High Yield -2.08% |
U.S. Bank Loans 8.65% |
U.S. Bank Loans 3.12% |
U.S. Agg -1.54% |
U.S. Agg -13.01% |
U.S. Agg 5.53% |
U.S. Agg 1.81% |
Sources: Cliffwater LLC and Wells Fargo Investment Institute. Data from 2014 to 2023. Direct Lending represented by the Cliffwater Direct Lending Index (CDLI), High Yield represented by the Bloomberg U.S. Corporate High Yield Index,, U.S. Bank Loans represented by the Morningstar LSTA U.S. Leveraged Loan Index, and the U.S. Agg represents the Bloomberg U.S. Aggregate Bond Index. An index is unmanaged and not available for direct investment.
Past performance is no guarantee of future results.
Alternative investments, such as hedge funds, private equity, private debt and private real estate funds are not appropriate for all investors and are only open to “accredited” or “qualified” investors within the meaning of U.S. securities laws.
Our view
Private Debt – Direct Lending strategies have historically proven to be a source of income for qualified investors. We believe an allocation to Direct Lending has the potential to benefit long-term, qualified investors and offer diversification. However, we maintain our neutral guidance on the category given the risks that remain in the macro-outlook. The uncertainty around the future path of inflation and interest rates and their potential impact on small and mid-sized businesses remains a concern. We expect to upgrade the Private Debt Direct Lending category if risks fade and confirmation that a gradual recovery phase in underway, as we expect.
2 Cliffwater 2023 Q4 (fourth quarter) Report on US Direct Lending.
3 Pitchbook | LCD.
4 Traditional default rates generally exclude the use of liability management transactions, often termed distressed exchanges. These deals include a variety of transactions including buybacks, tender offers, and exchange offers where the goal is to improve the overall liquidity profile and financial health of the company, while avoiding the traditional bankruptcy path. Distressed exchanges may include several types of restructurings aimed at reducing debt, extending maturities, or reducing regular debt service payments. Pitchbook | LCD provides data that includes these distressed exchange transactions.
Ready to raise our Real Estate rating?
call out “Every day is a journey, and the journey itself is home.”
— Matsuo Chuemon Munefusa end call out
Our current unfavorable rating on the S&P 500 Real Estate sector was initiated back on March 10, 2022. Since then, the Real Estate sector has underperformed the S&P 500 Index by nearly 40%. With such a strong move do we believe now is the time to cut and run with our alpha5 and upgrade Real Estate? Not yet.
In our view, there are some common characteristics across this varied sector that will likely weigh on performance. Investors historically have looked to Real Estate for yield with potential for a bit of cyclical growth kicker. Unfortunately for Real Estate, we see the potential for more attractive opportunities elsewhere for each of those factors. Tight and expensive bank credit, which real estate companies rely on to fund new projects, has constrained growth for the sector. Meanwhile, we believe there are more visible growth stories in neutral-rated Information Technology and Communication Services (anyone heard of artificial intelligence?) as well as our favorable-rated Energy, Industrials, and Materials sectors (large fiscal spending programs and higher forecasted oil prices). Additionally, fixed-income investments now offer a greater yield (see chart below) without the increased risk of loss in Real Estate equities. Finally, while not a significant weight in the sector, we suspect that the ongoing highly visible issues within Office Real Estate will likely continue to weigh on broad sector sentiment.
With more attractive opportunities with the potential for growth and yield available elsewhere, what does Real Estate offer that could bring back investors en masse? In our view, not enough to warrant an upgrade.
Which income source would you choose today?Sources: Bloomberg, Wells Fargo Investment Institute. Daily Data: January 1, 2010 – April 23, 2024. The S&P 500 Index Real Estate sector inception date was 2016. Dividend yield prior to 2016 estimated using the FTSE NAREIT All Equity REITs Index dividend yield. An index is unmanaged and not available for direct investment.
Past performance is no guarantee of future results.
5 Alpha is the outperformance earned above the benchmark for favorable-rated investments or the underperformance earned less than the benchmark for unfavorable-rated investments.
Near-term direction of U.S. interest rates
Will 10-year U.S. Treasury yields climb back to 5%? As expectations for Fed interest rate cuts have been scaled back, we believe the potential for interest rates to remain near current levels or to edge higher is increasing. Still, the question above may be best addressed by looking at two components — our outlook for the federal funds target interest rate and our outlook for longer-term 10-year U.S. Treasury yields.
Federal funds target rate
Our current view is that the Fed will attempt to cut rates twice before year-end; however, the probability for the federal funds rate to remain on hold at current levels has increased as inflation remains sticky. At the March Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meeting, members projected the median federal funds rate would be 4.625% by year-end 2024 — suggesting a strong downward bias in rates. However, over the past six weeks Fed officials have implicitly “walked back” some of those estimates, recognizing that it will take a while for them to be able to act. The next Fed meeting ending on May 1 is already considered to be a nonstarter.
Long-term rates
We expect the yield curve to continue to flatten, influenced mostly by higher long-term yields. Some of the reasons why we could see 10-year U.S. Treasury yields climb toward 5% is if the Fed openly removes rate cut expectations or outright hikes, if inflation climbs higher or real gross domestic product growth increases or if the U.S. fiscal situation deteriorates, causing demand to weaken just as supply of Treasuries increases.
Bias is for higher-for-longerSources: Wells Fargo Investment Institute and Bloomberg, as of April 19, 2024. Weekly data from January 2, 1990, to April 19, 2024. Rising yield periods highlighted in orange and pink dotted areas.
Past performance is no guarantee of future results.
Commodity bull super-cycle remains intact
We often think of commodities in individual terms, not as a collective family. Thinking of them individually makes sense, after all, each commodity has its own specific supply and demand fundamentals. For example, crude oil and gold are neither consumed nor supplied in the same manner. Crude oil is burned and consumed quickly, its supply in constant need of replacement. Gold, though, does not need its supply to be replaced so quickly. In fact, the supply never shrinks and perpetually grows over time. Gold is impervious to both air and water, meaning that nearly every ounce of gold ever mined, still sits somewhere above ground today.
Because individual commodities are fundamentally different, their price movements are often different too, especially over the short term. Over the long run, though, history tells us there have been periods when commodity prices trended more closely, moving as what we like to call a commodity family. These periods are called commodity bull super-cycles, and as the name implies, they many of these time periods have been positive for commodity prices.
One way to see this “family” connection is the chart below. The blue line represents the Bloomberg Commodity Total Return (BCOMTR) Index, made up of 19 commodities. The dashed orange line tracks the price correlation between these commodities. A rising correlation means that individual commodity prices are increasingly moving more like a family (bull super-cycles), while a falling correlation reflects the opposite. We believe the main messages in this chart are found by following the long-term trends, not the shorter-term wiggles. The long-term trend that we are in today, the bull super-cycle, started around March 2020.
We are highlighting this chart, however, because of what has happened over the short term. Commodity prices, and the family connection, were generally weak in 2023, which had some wondering if the bull super-cycle had run its course. Our answer has consistently been ��no, we doubt it”. Firstly, price pauses like 2023 are common during bulls. Secondly, our current bull is only four years old, while the shortest bull on record, using data back to the year 1800, is nine years. And lastly, short-term evidence has started to emerge that the commodity family connection has started growing again. Two examples of this are that 61% of commodities are positive in 2024, and more than 50% are above their 200-day moving averages.
Therefore, we believe the commodity bull super-cycle remains intact, and prices appear set to move higher over the coming years.
Commodity correlationsSources: Bloomberg and Wells Fargo Investment Institute. Daily data is from January 3, 1979 – April 23, 2024. An index is unmanaged and not available for direct investment.
Past performance is no guarantee of future results.
Cash Alternatives and Fixed Income
Most Unfavorable |
Unfavorable |
Neutral |
Favorable |
Most Favorable |
intentionally blank
|
- High Yield Taxable Fixed Income
|
- Cash Alternatives
- Developed Market Ex-U.S. Fixed Income
- Emerging Market Fixed Income
- U.S. Long Term Taxable Fixed Income
- U.S. Intermediate Term Taxable Fixed Income
|
- U.S. Taxable Investment Grade Fixed Income
|
- U.S. Short Term Taxable Fixed Income
|
Equities
Most Unfavorable |
Unfavorable |
Neutral |
Favorable |
Most Favorable |
|
|
- U.S. Mid Cap Equities
- Developed Market Ex-U.S. Equities
|
|
intentionally blank
|
Real Assets
Most Unfavorable |
Unfavorable |
Neutral |
Favorable |
Most Favorable |
intentionally blank
|
intentionally blank
|
|
|
intentionally blank
|
Alternative Investments**
Most Unfavorable |
Unfavorable |
Neutral |
Favorable |
Most Favorable |
intentionally blank
|
intentionally blank
|
- Hedge Funds—Event Driven
- Hedge Funds—Equity Hedge
- Private Equity
- Private Debt
|
- Hedge Funds—Relative Value
- Hedge Funds—Macro
|
intentionally blank
|
Source: Wells Fargo Investment Institute, April 29, 2024.
*Tactical horizon is 6-18 months
**Alternative investments are not appropriate for all investors. They are speculative and involve a high degree of risk that is appropriate only for those investors who have the financial sophistication and expertise to evaluate the merits and risks of an investment in a fund and for which the fund does not represent a complete investment program. Please see end of report for important definitions and disclosures.