Weak fundamentals limit upside for U.S. small-cap equities
The Russell 2000 Index, our benchmark for U.S. small-cap equities, has performed well in recent months, outperforming the S&P 500 Index, our benchmark for U.S. large-cap equities, year-to-date as of May20, 2026. While this may suggest a turning point in relative performance, we believe this recent momentum is masking weakness in underlying small-cap equity fundamentals. In our view, the divergence between price performance and fundamental trends creates an increasingly fragile backdrop for U.S. small-cap equities and reinforces our preference for U.S. large- and mid-cap equities.
A key challenge for U.S. small-cap equities is the structural decline in the Russell 2000 Index quality over time. The composition of the small-cap equities universe has shifted meaningfully over the past two decades, with a growing share of companies lacking consistent profitability. According to Bloomberg data, the percentage of non-earning companies within the Russell 2000 Index has risen dramatically from roughly 17% twenty years ago to 40% today, highlighting a broad deterioration in profitability.. We believe this trend reflects multiple forces, including the rise of private capital markets, which have allowed high-quality firms to remain private, as well as increased merger and acquisition activity, which has removed profitable companies from the public small-cap universe. As a result, U.S. small-cap indices have been populated by early-stage, less profitable, and more speculative businesses, which we believe inherently limits the ability of the asset class to generate sustained earnings growth and margin expansion.
Chart 1. 2026 earnings revisions: U.S. small- and large-cap earnings forecast revisions have diverged
Sources: Bloomberg and Wells Fargo Investment Institute. Consensus forecast data as of May 18, 2026. An index is unmanaged and not available for direct investment.
Past performance does not guarantee future results. Earnings revisions are based off Bloomberg data from analysts covering the S&P 500 Index and Russell 2000 Index.
This erosion in profitability is further reinforced by a persistent pattern of earnings disappointment. U.S. small-cap companies have historically struggled to meet initial calendar-year earnings expectations, with consensus forecasts declining by 20% from the start of the year through year-end, on average since 1995, per Bloomberg.. In fact, over these 30 years (1995 – 2025), the Russell 2000 Index has met or exceeded the consensus earnings forecast at the beginning of the year only three times. We are seeing a similar dynamic unfold currently, as earnings expectations for 2026 have been revised 7% lower as the year has progressed, as of May 18. (see Chart 1) this stands in contrast to U.S. large-cap equities, where earnings forecasts have jumped 8% higher (see Chart 1). Importantly, as earnings expectations for U.S. small-cap companies are revised downward, valuation multiples rise because the “E” in the price-to-earnings ratio is deteriorating.
The gap in profitability and financial strength between U.S. small- and large-cap equities is particularly striking today. U.S. small-cap equities currently generate returns on equity of less than 1% over a trailing 12 month period through Q1 2026, compared to approximately 20% for U.S. large-cap equities. Profit margins have exhibited an equally stark divergence, with U.S. small-cap net margins around 4.4% versus roughly 14.5.8% for U.S. large-cap companies over the same period. Balance sheet quality has further compounded these challenges. U.S. small-cap companies tend to carry high leverage, with net debt-to-EBITDA1 ratios near 4.5x compared to roughly 1.5x for U.S. large-cap firms, based on a trailing 12 month period through Q1 2026.. This elevated leverage not only may increase financial risk but also may reduce flexibility in a higher interest rate environment.
In contrast, U.S. large-cap equities continued to benefit from a set of structural advantages that have driven sustained margin expansion over time. Profit margins for the S&P 500 Index are at historical highs and have trended upward over several decades. This expansion has been supported by a combination of favorable sector composition, technological innovation, and operational efficiency gains. The increasing weight of high-margin sectors (particularly Information Technology and Communication Services) has played a significant role, as these businesses tend to operate with asset-light models, high gross margins, and strong operating leverage.
Beyond sector mix, U.S. large-cap companies have been leaders in adopting productivity-enhancing technologies, including artificial intelligence (AI), automation, and advanced data analytics. These investments have improved efficiency, reduced labor intensity, and enhanced scalability. At the same time, economies of scale enable large companies to spread fixed costs over broader revenue bases, negotiate more favorable supplier terms, and invest more heavily in research and development. These scale advantages can create a reinforcing cycle of competitive strength and margin durability.
Taken together, these structural advantages have allowed U.S. large-cap (S&P 500 Index) profit margins to expand steadily over time, while U.S. small-cap margins have remained stagnant. Importantly, we believe the elevated margins observed in U.S. large-cap equities are not solely a function of cyclical strength but reflect enduring competitive advantages that provide insulation against macroeconomic softness. We view this resilience as important in the current environment, where growth uncertainties persist and cost pressures remain unevenly distributed across the economy.
Ultimately, while the recent performance of U.S. small-cap equities (Russell 2000 Index) may appear encouraging, we believe it is not supported by fundamentals. The combination of declining earnings quality, persistent downward consensus earnings revisions, weak profitability, and elevated leverage presents a challenging backdrop for sustained outperformance. In contrast, U.S. large-cap equities (S&P 500 Index), especially since 2024, have demonstrated strong earnings, robust margins, and structural advantages that support long-term growth and resilience. As such, we view the recent rally in U.S. small-cap equities as an opportunity to rebalance portfolios. We believe investors should consider rimming overweight exposures and reallocating toward U.S. large and mid-cap equities, where the fundamental outlook remains significantly more compelling.
1 EBITDA (Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation, and Amortization) measures a company’s core operational performance by excluding financing costs, tax effects, and non-cash accounting items like depreciation and amortization.
Long-term rates to likely rise
We look for the Fed to proceed cautiously, calibrating as needed but with a bias to keep the federal funds target rate on hold. We are expecting no cuts or hikes between now and the end of 2026. However, federal funds futures markets are now implying potential for hikes in 2027, especially if the Iran conflict extends for longer.
We expect the bond market to remain sensitive to geopolitical events, Fed policy announcements, and economic developments, especially around the trajectory of inflation and how the Fed adjusts policy. Also, the term premium (the extra yield investors demand for holding long-term debt in lieu of short-term debt) has also been rising. We anticipate upward pressure to remain in term premium given increasing deficits, further Treasury issuance and the potential for Fed balance sheet trimming.
These policy and economic uncertainties present return risks that are asymmetrically larger for longer-term bonds, which mathematically have the largest price impact from a change in rates (see Chart 2). Hence, we believe that investors need to remain agile — if rates rise well above our year-end 2026 stated targets, we prefer to extend maturities; if rates decline below our targets, we favor shortening duration (a measure of interest rate sensitivity) by taking shorter maturities.
We still think the income component of fixed income should remain a key driver of total return for investors in 2026, while active management is crucial, in our view, to capture relative value within fixed-income sectors and subsectors.
Chart 2. Long-maturity bonds are most sensitive to a move in interest rates
Sources: Bloomberg and Wells Fargo Investment Institute, as of May 19, 2026. T-bills (Treasury bills): Bloomberg U.S. Treasury Bills (1–3M) Index, Investment-grade (IG) taxable fixed income: Bloomberg U.S. Aggregate Bond Index. IG corporates: Bloomberg U.S. Corporate Bond Index, High yield: Bloomberg U.S. Corporate High Yield Bond Index, Asset-backed securities: Bloomberg U.S. Asset Backed Securities Index, Mortgage-backed securities: Bloomberg U.S. Mortgage-Backed Securities Index, Municipals: Bloomberg Municipal Index. For illustrative purposes only. Expected return is calculated by the income return (interest) plus the price change from the 0.50% interest rate move. An index is unmanaged and not available for direct investment.
Past performance is no guarantee of future results.
Surging exports squeeze inventories
As the Iran war extends into May, pressures on U.S. petroleum inventories are beginning to emerge. Although the U.S. position as a net energy exporter provided some insulation from the immediate global supply shocks, oil markets are interconnected, meaning the U.S. is not immune to the lasting effects of higher global prices and supply disruptions.
This dynamic can be seen in how trade flows have shifted and are starting to pull on U.S. inventories. The loss of Middle East energy exports left many countries seeking alternative suppliers, and the strong growth in U.S. production along with lower transportation risks make U.S. exports an attractive alternative.
These factors supported a surge in U.S. export demand from a 52 week average of 4 million barrels per day (mbpd) prior to the Iran war, to 6.4 mbpd during the week of April 24. This pressured already declining inventories, driven by heightened refining activity and an emergency 172 million-barrel release from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve earlier this year (see Chart 3). In effect, these drawdowns have reduced some of the U.S. supply buffer heading into the summer.
Upcoming seasonal demand could intensify these pressures, as inventories typically decline during the summer from increased consumption. For consumers, this will likely translate into further gasoline prices over the coming months.
As such, elevated energy prices will likely persist as inventories continue to draw down, which could lead to higher inflation and slower economic growth. For investors, however, we do not recommend chasing returns in energy with oil prices already elevated near $100 per barrel. In our view, the risk-to-return is unattractive, and we expect supply constraints to ease over the next 12–18 months. We recommend taking profits in energy and rotating exposure to our favorably rated areas that show greater upside over the tactical horizon — such as Precious or Industrial Metals.
Chart 3. U.S. petroleum inventories pressured lower
Sources: Bloomberg and Wells Fargo Investment Institute. Weekly data is from January 5, 2006 through May 8, 2026. Petroleum inventories represent total crude oil and petroleum product inventories.
Crosscurrents persist in distressed credit markets
As we assess opportunities in distressed credit, signals remain mixed, raising questions about whether business conditions have truly stabilized or if the recent decline in defaults may reverse. On one hand, default rates2, including distressed exchanges, have been trending lower, suggesting some easing of financial stress (see Chart 4 - left). Distressed exchanges include out-of-court restructurings that reduce debt, extend maturities, or lower interest costs, designed to help companies stabilize their balance sheets.
On the other hand, a key countersignal is the rising share of bank loans trading at distressed levels (below 80% of face value), which typically indicates borrower stress (see Chart 4 - right). This trend suggests that underlying pressures may still be building and that the recent improvement in default activity could prove temporary.
Distressed credit sub-strategies primarily invest in fundamentally strong companies that are experiencing financial strain, often due to excessive debt. Through restructuring or reducing that debt burden, these companies can emerge with stronger balance sheets and improved financial flexibility, positioning them for future growth.
While mixed signals in the credit markets suggest a transitional environment, we remain constructive on distressed credit sub-strategies. These strategies have historically performed strongest during the recovery phase following periods of significant credit dislocation, when valuations have reset and underlying fundamentals begin to stabilize.
Chart 4. Default rates (including distressed exchanges) show recent decline while distress ratios rise
Sources: Pitchbook (Leveraged Commentary and Data) and Morningstar. Data shown is from the Morningstar Loan Syndications and Trading Association (LSTA) U.S. Leveraged Loan Index. Data as of April 30, 2026.
Alternative investments, such as hedge funds, private equity, private debt and private real estate funds are not appropriate for all investors and are only open to “accredited” or “qualified” investors within the meaning of U.S. securities laws.
2 Default is defined as a failure to meet contractual obligations, primarily caused by missed interest or principal payments or bankruptcy filing. The default rate referenced is for the Morningstar Loan Syndications and Trading Association (LSTA) U.S. Leveraged Loan Index, inclusive of distressed exchanges. Distressed exchanges include all liability management transactions, which are typically out-of-court restructurings designed to improve the financial position of a company by reducing debt, extending maturities, or lowering debt-service obligations. S&P Global Ratings determines situations that are considered a distressed exchange or default.
Cash Alternatives and Fixed Income
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| Most Unfavorable |
Unfavorable |
Neutral |
Favorable |
Most Favorable |
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- U.S. Long Term Taxable Fixed Income
- U.S. Short Term Taxable Fixed Income
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- Cash Alternatives
- Developed Market Ex-U.S. Fixed Income
- Emerging Market Fixed Income
- High Yield Taxable Fixed Income
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- U.S. Intermediate Term Taxable Fixed Income
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Equities
| Most Unfavorable |
Unfavorable |
Neutral |
Favorable |
Most Favorable |
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- Developed Market Ex-U.S. Equities
- Emerging Market Equities
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- U.S. Large Cap Equities
- U.S. Mid Cap Equities
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Real Assets
| Most Unfavorable |
Unfavorable |
Neutral |
Favorable |
Most Favorable |
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- Commodities
- Private Real Estate
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Alternative Investments**
| Most Unfavorable |
Unfavorable |
Neutral |
Favorable |
Most Favorable |
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- Hedge Funds—Equity Hedge
- Hedge Funds—Macro
- Hedge Funds—Relative Value
- Private Equity
- Private Debt
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Source: Wells Fargo Investment Institute, May 26, 2026. Please see Wells Fargo Investment Institute's Asset Allocation Strategy Report for more detailed, investable ideas in each asset group.
*Tactical horizon is 6-18 months
**Alternative investments are not appropriate for all investors. They are speculative and involve a high degree of risk that is appropriate only for those investors who have the financial sophistication and expertise to evaluate the merits and risks of an investment in a fund and for which the fund does not represent a complete investment program. Please see end of report for important definitions and disclosures.